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Introduction
Euclid’s Elements, written in the third century BC., during the reign of
Ptolemy I, is, second to the Bible, only in number of reprints. Those published
in the XVIth and XVIIth centuries are, either philological examinations of the
corpus, or the basis of philosophical commentaries, or mathematical treatises
or even pedagogical handbooks. Among those very numerous reprints, I shall
only quote from the version oﬀered by Christopher Clavius, which, as far as
we know, was referred to by all XVII th century specialists.
This Euclidean reference fed equally all ﬁelds of intellectual production,
whether philosophical, mathematical or pedagogical and the Elements was
the common, cultural inspiration of mathematicians and natural philosophers
from the end of the XVIth century to that of the XVIIth.
1. The Elements and the Switch to Mathe-
matical Physic
Now, what part do the Elements play in the basic inspiration of the scien-
tiﬁc revolution, that is the use of mathematics in natural philosophy? All
the authors we shall mention do cherish the “new”concept that the laws of
nature are to be discovered and enunciated in mathematical terms. Thus,
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we have to examine Galileo’s case. The adequation of geometry to mate-
rial phenomena is undoubtedly for him the criterion which distinguishes the
various philosophical attitudes; such is the stake (l’enjeu) disputed between
Simplicio, the champion of Aristoteles in his Dialogo, and Salviati and Sagre-
do, the modern scientist and the man of culture. Clear is the program, but
most diﬃcult its actualisation. Galileo’s physics is, obviously, determined by
what mathematics are at is disposal, and, conversely, mathematical notions
re elaborated trough the basic concepts of the new natural philosophy. Now,
what mathematics can he use, if not, above all, Euclid’s Elements? But it so
happens that Euclid’s work has not been conceived as a language permitting
an immediate dialogue with natural phenomena, but as the foundation of a
pure, abstract science. Thus, the Elements deals with such quantities as num-
bers, lines, surfaces, volumes and angles, while Galilean (and post Galilean
physics) concerns ponderous bodies, time, speeds and densities.
Such is the context to grasp Roberval’s warning to the reader when opening
Book IV of his Elements of geometry : “there may exist a ratio between two
objects which you do not compare as quantities: such is the case if you
compare weights, lights, sounds, motions, forces and other attributes. But
this ratio does not belong to pure geometry, which only includes the ﬁve
modes we have mentioned [. . . ] All other ratios belongs to physics. Still you
cannot but use them in the mixed mathematics of physics, as in optics, in
mechanics, in music, astronomy, etc. which are not exactly relevant here, since
we intend to restrict our examination to geometrical ratios. But it must be
kept in mind that the very same method we shall use in these present work
will be of the same utility when we have to study other ratios. Thus, this
warning is but meant to exclude those ratios which do not belong to geometry
and which, accordingly, will be dealt with in some other place.”
The natural philosophers in the steps of Galileo, mean to exploit, to carry
over the solutions of pure geometry to ﬁelds which those notions did not ini-
tially concern. According to the Aristotelian tradition, mathematics is not a
science of material objects, but nor is it a science of objects actually existing
apart from material objects (it is not a science of ideals objects). What is
posits (suppose) as distinct has no autonomous existence in nature. Besides
(en outre) -and frequently enough- that nature you want to express in ma-
thematical terms, oﬀers but changing phenomena and functional relationship
between those “quantities”.
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Galileo can hardly ﬁnd, in traditional mathematics, tools to account for those
relationships. Euclidean mathematical tools, which Galileo cannot but refer
to, oﬀer “too meagre a design to satisfy the demands of physics”and can
serve only a very elementary physics.
Galileo had intended to add a ﬁfth and sixth “day”to his Discorsi e dimostra-
tione matematische sobre due nuove scienze, the sixth one -never ﬁnished-
was to study percussion and the ﬁfth the theory of proportions. It was not
included in the treatise as published in 1638, but composed a short time after
with the help of Torricelli.
I shall mention but one of those elementary but taxing obstacles he faces: two
quantities can bee proportional only if they are homogeneous (line and line,
number and number etc.). This is an essential feature of the theory, which
we just forget when we identify the measure of a quantity and the quantity
itself - a measure being nothing but a proportion. Thus, it is not possible to
symbolise directly a physical quantity -speed for instance, as the ratio of a
space and a time interval which are heterogeneous; another example would
be a speciﬁc weight as the ratio of a weight and a volume.
The constraints imposed on physics by those presently ineﬃcient tools bring
some “light”on a precise and vexing point concerning the theory of falling
bodies. Two developments, one from Galileo, the other from Descartes, cha-
llenge the reader as both contain a “mathematical error”in their use of Eu-
clidean proportions. Let us conclude that Euclidean mathematics and phy-
sical concepts do not mix peacefully. One will thus keep in mind that the
developing program to account for natural phenomena through mathematics
will, on one hand enlist and stimulate Euclidean geometry, and on the other
hand demand new concepts.
2. Demonstrative Order and Prime Proposi-
tions
Among Euclidean propositions, some are not deduced from antecedents: they
are either common notions or axioms, demands (the so called postulates),
or deﬁnitions. The XVIIth century writers criticize the Elements from two
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opposite point of view. For some, Euclid has deﬁned too many terms and
demonstrated too many propositions; for the others, the ﬂaw is the lack of
deﬁnitions and demonstrations.
We shall then give some examples of a ﬁrst category of criticisms:
1. The third common notion (“when substracting equal things from equal
things, remainders are equal”) can, and thus must be demonstrated.
2. The deﬁnition of a straight line (“a line is straight when it runs evenly
through the points it contains”-Book I, def. 4) is not suﬃcient, for it
wants a statement of existence- not to mention that the very choice of
the deﬁnition is ambiguous.
3. The construction of an equilateral triangle (“on a limited straight line,
construct an equilateral triangle”, Book I, prop.1) wants proofs, as the
demonstration posits that the two auxiliary circles intersect, and thus
postulates some principle of continuity.
4. The property concerning equal circle arcs (Book III, prop. 28) should be
extended to the examination of unequal arcs. On this point -and many
others- Euclid does not satisfy the demand for complete and general
solutions.
5. Even though (sou) (bien que) the presupposition of a total order on ﬁnite
(fainait) homogeneous quantities may be detected in Book V, prop. 9,
10 and 13, no statement (were it a postulate) exists to back it.
6. At last, it would be possible (and thus necessary) to start from a better
deﬁnition of the relation of order, so as to demonstrate why the whole
is larger than the part (a property prosecuted as the eighth common
notion).
On the other hand, a second category of criticisms points at the uselessness of
such statements: the straight line has no need of a statement of existence, but
what is more, its very deﬁnition is unsuccessful, or even harmful (nuisible), as it
creates confusion about a notion of perfect clarity per se. To Roberval, who,
in a lengthy sequence of statements, propose a deﬁnition of a straight line
as the invariant ensemble in a rotating solid, Arnaud opposes the following
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approach: “The notions of a ﬂat surface and of a straight line are so simple
that you would only obscure them trying to give deﬁnitions. The one thing
which is required is to give examples so as to have the notion inlaid into the
words of diﬀerent languages”. Total is the disagreement and the deﬁnition
of a straight line through the invariants initiates a geometry founded on the
properties of isomorphous transformations, a geometry that refuses intuitive
or natural notions.
The construction of an equilateral triangle is useless, as it is a self evident
truth, well-known to all. In the same way, the property concerning equal arcs
and their sub tenses is intuitively grasped and does not require a demonstra-
tion; as to the order of quantities, it raises no problem and is self-evident.
Finally, that the whole is larger than his part is a prime principle, so obvious
that it does not need a demonstration (on that point, Arnauld agrees with
Euclid).
To persuade (pirsweid) ourselves that the two approaches were simultaneous-
ly at work, we have only to read the treatises of Roberval advocating the
ﬁrst line, and those of Arnaud, championing the second. Both men, at the
same time, ascribe themselves a similar task: to examine Euclid’s Elements
and reform them. They express similar diagnoses: the Alexandrine’s work
is imperfect, an even unﬁt to impart satisfactory bases to those who intend
to venture in the ﬁeld of geometry. Antoine Arnaud has the ﬁrst edition
of his New elements of geometry published in 1667, while Roberval starts
writing the last version of his Elements of geometry in 1669. According to
the ﬁrst author, Euclid’ Elements ignores the natural order and clear ideas;
for the second, the ﬂaw is that the demand for demonstrations is not pre-
ssing enough. A comparative study of their Elements of geometry reveals how
much Arnaud means “to give fewer demonstrations”(than Euclid) whereas
Roberval intends “to give many more”.
2.1. Intuitionism
“It seems to me absolutely fruitless to look far and wide for proofs to some-
thing we cannot question, provided (pourvu que) we pay some attention to
it”, Arnaud writes. To demand too many demonstrations is a mistake and
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would ignore the necessary humility of the human understanding: “geome-
ters, being more prone to convince than to enlighten the mind, believe they
will be more convincing by inventing some proofs, even of the most obvious
points, than by merely stating them and leaving to the mind the care to
acknowledge its evidence”.
Such a doctrine (doctrin) is developed at length in the Logic of Port Royal.
Descartes partly inspired this very critical approach, and we recognise an
eﬀect of the theory of clear and distinct ideas. As against a steril logics, he
stresses knowledge is acquired through intuition and deduction. Deﬁnitions,
axioms, postulates, are accepted as warranted by the “mind’s vision”. The
axioms of elementary geometry are eternal truths; indeed, God might have
created diﬀerent ones, but we cannot but submit to what they teach us.
“Descartes retains as a mood the unquestioned evidence of Euclid Elements”,
wrote Yvon Belaval.
Pascal’s position is less abrupt:
“Geometrical knowledge does not deﬁne everything, nor does it prove eve-
rything, but it works only on things which natural light renders clear and
permanently true. This knowledge does not demand that everything be de-
ﬁned and demonstrated, but to keep half-way, that is not to deﬁne those
things that are clear and understood by all men, but to deﬁne all other
things. Do sin (pe´cher) equally against the essence of geometry those who
undertake to deﬁne and prove everything, and those who do not care to do
it when things are not self-evident [. . . ]”.
The Pascalian way of dealing with Euclid amounts to a sort of chiaoscuro. He
admires and respects this masterpiece, he sees it as a model of the asymptotic
proximity between geometry and the perfect method of knowledge. Mean-
while, he agrees to the necessity of a reorganisation and reform of the thir-
teen books. One cannot account for (expliquer) Pascal’s approach except one
keeps in mind his ﬁrst aim is not to found the absolute certainty of knowled-
ge, but in the process to improve his own power to convince. Mathematical
argument and reasoning may not be seen apart from similar processes used
in treatises dealing with ethics, apologetics or physics. The art of persuasion
is identical in all these ﬁelds. Indeed, it appears in a purer -simpler- form in
mathematics, but it would be a mistake to think it is more speciﬁc in that
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ﬁeld.
The conceptions of Descartes’, Arnaud’s (and to a lesser degree of Pascal’s)
converge to spare them (leur e´pargner) the search for a “general economy”of
ﬁrst principles as related to one another. Each author, in his own way, con-
cerns himself with the unquestionability of the principles, and leaves aside
their organisation as a system of logics.
3. The Urge to Demonstrate
Roberval takes a ﬁrm stand against the previous approach. “Each thing can
be demonstrated, whatever clarity or evidence it may seem to have by itself,
as there exist other obvious truths which may be selected and utilized to
demonstrate the ﬁrst one. The reason for this is that, since it can be de-
monstrated, it cannot be styled a principle, since principles may not derive
from other principles, or any other statement, but must be, each for itself,
grounded on itself only. Thus does a science achieve perfection, in that it
is simpler, since it is grounded on as few evident and undemonstrated prin-
ciples as possible. More generally, any mathematical truth which is not a
principle must be demonstrated; otherwise it cannot be received, being but
an indeﬁnite part separated from the whole it belongs to, which would break
the unity of science, a unity which must be preserved at all costs”
Roberval thus considers the perfection of science as endangered by the lack of
demonstrations, while Pascal and Arnaud saw that danger as coming from an
excess of demonstrations. For Roberval, the intrinsic true of statement is no
criterion of their status: his geometry is not a collection of true statements.
What is essential is the optimisation of the structure as one whole, the return
of the “deductive input”.
The “intuitive”, or evident, simple, immediately clear, aspect of prime prin-
ciples loses strength, as their value as hypotheses is strengthened.
What reform had been advocated for axioms and postulates is extended to
deal with deﬁnitions. Roberval bears three reproaches against Euclid.
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1. Many of his deﬁnitions are not explicit: such is the case with part,
length, limit, breadth, gradient (inclinaison), equality, bigger or less-
er, continuity, interval, whole, area, quantity, measure (mizer), oneness,
plurality and depth.
2. Other ones are ambiguous and want strength, as evidence by the three
deﬁnitions of the ratio (def.3, 4, 5 in Book V).
3. Finally, several deﬁnitions are never backed by a statement of existence
that would confer them what actually would legitimate a demonstrative
process: deﬁnition of line, surface and plane (2,5,7, Book I) of the part
and of the multiple of a quantity (1 and 2, Book V), of the unit and
the integer (1 and 2, Book VII), of the solid (XI,1).
4. Geometry Reduced to Logic
Later in the century, a same sort of approach has to be mentioned, but
in an extreme form: Leibniz, repeatedly stressed the necessity to deﬁne and
demonstrate beyond an unquestionable evidence. Sound (saine) is the method
to stake principles whose certainty is not absolute and then to deduce nece-
ssary consequences: whether these be true or not, the deductive link in itself
adds knowledge and thus, legitimates the process. From this point of view,
Euclid style is praise worthy, and it is fortunate that the ancients and es-
pecially Euclid “decided to push forward before demonstrating these axioms
they were obliged to use”. In this ﬁrst respect, the Euclidean corpus is to
be admired for the organisation of its logical and deductive structure. Those
logical demands made it possible to go beyond empirical geometry, which
is advantageous in terms of method, but from a practical point of view as
well, since one may demonstrate properties which cannot be discovered by
intuition nor imagination, such as asymptots or the ﬁnite measure (fainait
mizer) of some areas of inﬁnite extension.
Such results, though, does not imply one should not proceed much further
-upstream, so to say- in the analysis of principles than ancients as Euclid, and
possibly than contemporary mathematicians have done. Examples borrowed
from Euclid are frequently used by Leibniz to show it is possible to reduce the
94
An Everpresent Reference Of The Xviith Century . . .
axiomatic bases through the demonstration of explicit or implicitly accepted
statements: part and whole, subtraction of equal quantities from equal quan-
tities, the ﬁfth postulate, intersections of circles, the existence of the plane:
similarly, it is not the “clarity”of the expressed concept which legitimates a
deﬁnition, but the demonstration that the deﬁned notion is possible, i.e. non
contradictory.
“I am convinced”Leibniz writes, “that to make sciences more perfect, it is
even necessary to supply demonstrations for some propositions known as a-
xioms, in the way Apollonius get to demonstrate some of those which Euclid
had left undemonstrated. Euclid was right, but by how much more Apo-
llonius. It is not indispensable to do it, but of some importance and even
necessary in some regard. The late M. Roberval had in mind his Nouveaux
e´le´ments de ge´ome´trie, in which he meant to give close demonstrations to
several propositions Euclid stated or implied. I do not know whether he saw
the end of his work before he died, but I do know many people laughed at
him; if they had know the importance of the matter, they would have had
second thoughts. It may not be necessary for apprentices, nor for the common
pedagogues, but to advance sciences and sail past Hercules’ columns, nothing
is more necessary”.
Leibniz logical project amounts to reducing all those ﬁelds of knowledge ruled
by an absolute or metaphysical necessity (geometry being one of them) to
one and the same principle, that of identity. All demonstrations, as well as
deﬁnitions could be deduced from that one statement, A is A. Basically, all
other axiomatic forms have but a temporary justiﬁcation.
Speaking of Leibniz, one has to determine the part of Euclid’s Elements in his
ambitious project of Characteristica Universalis which was to be an absolute-
ly explicit and univocal language, allowing some sort of an automatic com-
putation of concepts. “If mathematics, geometry, algebra, arithmetic (even
latest developments and inﬁnitesimal methods) constitute but one ﬁeld of the
great formal science of order, they agree so well with the Characteristica
that they will supply quite a share of the paradigm of the Characteristica
Universalis. It is to geometry that Characteristica Universalis applies best
-at least most immediately”.
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No element of Euclid’s geometry would be posited in the Characteristica geo-
metrica “for it allows to rediscover, through that kind of computation eve-
rything that geometry teaches, even to its elements, in an analytical and de-
termined process”. That over-ambitious project survives only through some
simples, somewhat elementary, examples and not immune to criticisms.
The reading of Euclid by XVIIth century authors thus draws a real bifurcation
between mathematicians leaning (s’appuyant) on intuition and self-evidence
(Arnaud, Descartes) and mathematicians prone to ground their science in
axiomatics (Leibniz, after Roberval and Pascal). “What Descartes initiated
was that mathematical option which deems (juge) ridiculous, or nearly so,
the critical approach to axioms; what Leibniz prepared was the road to axio-
matics ”, writes Belaval. One thus observes the rediscovery of two strong
traditions of geometry, proceeding from those interpretations of Euclid’s:
one aims at constituting this ﬁeld as a positive, or even natural science, the
other means to found it as hypothetical and deductive.
5. The Straight Line and the Theory of Pa-
rallels
As could be expected, the theory of parallels and what pertains to the ﬁfth de-
mand are good indicators of the approaches to Euclid in the XVIIth century.
J.C. Pont, an historian of mathematics, has written that “since the epoch-
making commentary of Proclus, one answer has crossed centuries, handbooks,
works dealing with the history of geometry: the ﬁfth postulate is not evident
enough to be vested with the dignity of an undemonstrable proposition”.
Thus, the choice has always been either to demonstrate it, or to demonstrate
an equivalent proposition (which amounts to the same), or to posit another
and more acceptable postulate so as to reorganise the axiomatic bases and
transform the former postulate into a theorem”
No wonder Arnaud is found among the many ones who denounce the “mis-
take”to demonstrate so obvious a proposition. Arnaud organises his chapter
on parallelism according to a sequence of “natural”demands; six axioms are
enumerated at once, the sixth one reading “two straight lines, when extended
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on the same side, will get closer to each other, and ﬁnally intersect [. . . ] Eu-
clid sees this proposition as a principle, and rightly so; for it is clear enough
to satisfy the understanding, and it would be a waste of time to rack one’s
brains to prove it through circuitous reasons”.
As to other propositions and results concerning parallels and the ﬁfth pos-
tulate, they are deduced from the property, given as an axiom, that the
normal to the middle of a segment is the set of points equally distant from
the two extremities. To justify this axiom, Arnaud only writes “I contend
that to consider the very nature of the straight line proves the truth of this
proposition”.
On the other hand, XVIIth century authors will join those who mean to
demonstrate it. It had been supported that it was the intention of Euclid
himself, for it is possible to retrace his many endeavours (indevors) to down-
grade, as much as possible, the postulate in the Elements.
Euclid deﬁnes parallels as “straight lines that will not meet”(I,23). Critics
ﬁrst used an other deﬁnition of parallelism, and specially the following one:
“parallel straight lines are equidistant ones”. Such a deﬁnition was favoured
by some of the major Ancient and then Arabs geometers (Posidonius, Aganis,
Tabit-ibn Qurra or Ibn al Haytam). This deﬁnition, if supplemented by the
exhibition of two such lines is known to be equivalent to the ﬁfth postulate,
whose demonstration is then possible, starting from the deﬁnition through
equidistance and a statement of existence.
Some authors, intending to demonstrate the celebrate postulate, will thus
concentrate on the existence of equidistant straight lines. Roberval achieves
this aim, trough his famous quadrangle including three right angles. It has
been shown, of course, that the whole process rests on an axiomatic diﬀerent
from Euclid’s, but ﬁnally equivalent. This intense scrutiny of the postulate
status and the close examination of the underlying axiomatics will be most
instrumental in the initial steps towards non-euclidean geometries (especially
in the works of Saccheri and Lambert).
As Henri Saville had remarked, as early as 1620, “there are two blemishes in
the body of geometry. One of them being the ﬁfth postulate, the second one
being the ungeometrical and useless deﬁnition of compounded ratios”. The
second cause for those sleepless nights is what I will presently address.
97
Memorias XIV Encuentro de Geometr´ıa y II de Aritme´tica
6. The Theory of Proportions
As ﬁreworks displaying their utmost magniﬁcence in a ﬁnal bouquet, this
theory displays its utmost potentialities before it disappears, displaced by
the automatic process of the algebraic calculus. The theory of proportions,
inherited from Euclid’s Elements appears to XVIIth century mathematicians
as indispensable, but very core of their procedures of demonstration. Mean-
while, the attempts to complete, modify and enlarge it, multiply. Three types
of obstacles inspire and account for such attempts:
1. Those which are related to long-known internal deﬁciencies: the com-
parative and not self-operating nature of the ratio, the want of a total
order of ratios, the implicit acceptance of the fourth term in a propor-
tion, as well as the twofold handling (traitement) of quantities, depen-
ding on whether they are continuous or integers.
2. Those which are related to a broader concept of numbers, an age-old
notion but which will be more precisely actualised in the XVIth and
XVIIth centuries; such an evolution is more speciﬁcally connected with
the general switch to algebraic methods.
3. Finally those which derive from the demand to incorporate inﬁnite
(inﬁnit) sets of ratios of inﬁnitesimal quantities. The use of mathematics
by the new natural philosophy required such modes of calculus; more
especially, it is the central point in the Galilean, and then Newtonian
cinematics.
6.1. Relation or Quantity
The Euclidean ratio, properly speaking, is neither a number nor a quantity;
still in the original text, it takes in many ways after a quantity: it is shown
to be equal, or unequal, or to lend itself to operation-like transformations.
The research to give ratios a mathematical status allowing operations (and
thus not conceiving them as relations only) is given a new impetus when
the Euclidean text is re-examined; thus does Clavius breathes new life in the
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theory of denominatio. To any ratio is associated a denominatio while is but
“that number which exposes clearly and openly the way one quantity relates
to another”. This somewhat vague concept was expected to allow ratios to
be compared, to be composed through the multiplication of denominatios
etc.
Clavius is certainly wrong when he claims his interpretation is the only one
true to Euclid, and that all authors who diﬀer betray the Alexandrin geome-
ter. Many arguments can be mustered against the existence -be it implicit-
of such a notion as the multiplication of ratios in Euclid’s work. There are
but two results (VI.23 and VIII.5) in the whole Elements connected with
composition of ratios. The refusal to identify the composition of ratios with
a multiplication of quantities is a ﬁrm stand, and championed till a late
period. Many authors, Newton one of them, consider that ratios cannot be
composed as numbers are, and that they do not partake of the same nature
as quantities.
6.2. An Attempt Towards a Reform: Arnaud
The doctrine of proportions raises a touchy point for those who consider
intuition and clear ideas, or evidence, to be the foundations of mathema-
tics. Indeed, one cannot state intuitive truths -clear and distinct ones, that
is -concerning ratios and the equality of ratios. On that question, Arnaud
is “trapped”. While the theory of proportions is very much present in his
geometry, it works uneasily and painstakingly. He ignores the deﬁnition of
the Fifth Book, possibly because he deems it too distant from the criteria of
evidence - in what he is right.
Arnaud, who had intended to simplify the prime concept of the theory is
unable to avoid deadlocks (de se sortir de l’impasse) , as shown by his warning
XXIX: “What notion I propose of equal ratios would be suﬃcient, were it
always possible to appreciate whether antecedents are to be found equally in
the derived quantities -which, most often is uneasy”
He then initiates a second deﬁnition of equal ratios, which deﬁnition, “one
of the most diﬃcult in geometry”, also has unexpected consequences and
heads to contradictions. J.L. Gardies, when examining Arnaud’s attempts,
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discovers unsteadiness and awkward (maladroits) uses of suspiciously selected
instances. Intuitive clarity gives birth to confusion and Arnaud, in the follo-
wing printings of Nouveaux e´le´ments de ge´ome´trie will use a deﬁnition much
closer to that of Book V.
6.3. An Orthodox Endeavour to Reexamine Matters:
Roberval.
As many contemporaries, Roberval forsakes the division of the theory of
proportions into two parts (quantities and numbers). Numbers are quantities
as well, and the theory of Book V must be made valid for numbers too. Apart
from this point, his proceedings are the most orthodox in this period. He
discards such solutions as might ignore the diﬃcult points of Euclid’s theory,
the one which proposed a deﬁnition of the ratio diﬀerent from Euclid’s, and
the one which extended numbers so as to include continuous quantities and
even ratios. He remains true to Euclid -allowing for important “nuances”in
his deﬁnitions of numbers and ratios. His intention is to fuse the arithmetical
books of Euclid into Book ﬁve.
Numbers, multiples and divisor of numbers, Euclid’s Algorithm, all the spe-
ciﬁcs tools of arithmetics are included in his book VI about proportions in
general: an original and successful attempt.
Roberval stressed the necessity to arrange in order the whole set of ratios,
no easy task. Thanks to his deﬁnition and by using the order existing among
equimultiples, he demonstrates that such relations as “bigger than”or “lesser
than”are reciprocal, and for ratios as well. Appreciating Roberval’ s results,
one may deem that the logical structure of ratios is far better argumented in
his Elements than in Euclid’s and allows for a more eﬃcient operational use
of the theory. Still, as he declines to assimilate ratios to numbers or quanti-
ties permitting internal operations, the diﬃculty increases, so that the logical
structure, even though strengthened, cannot escape some sort of ghost-like
quality: ratios still share an ambiguous status between relations and quanti-
ties.
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6.4. An Attempt to Reach a Conclusion: Gre´goire de
Saint Vincent
What is lacking in Euclid’s theory which would enable it to solve geometrical
problems, whether old or new? Very little, is the answer of the Jesuit Gre´goire
de Saint Vincent. Committing a blunder (gaﬀe) he will atone for a long time
in the purgatory of underrated scientists, he publishes a big treaty which so
perfectly completes the theory of proportions that he claims it can bring a
solution to the oldest and most stubborn problem, that of squaring the circle.
The Opus Geometricum of Gregoire nevertheless remains an important work.
First because you can ﬁnd therein brilliant ideas to be developed in later
years, such as the squaring of the hyperbola; but also because he exploits the
almost possibilities of Euclid’s Book V. The author is aware his project will
face scepticism: how could such an antiquated (vieillie) theory supply now
what solutions it has proved unable to propose for so many centuries? So, he
claims a little “push”is necessary:
“Such is the reason why I thought it good to discover new ways and new
methods which could ﬁll the wants of ancient geometry -namely by looking
for the magnitude, that is to say the quantity, of any ratio, if you see it as
indeﬁnitely [ad infinitum ] extended”.
As observed by Jean Dhombres, “it really is a conclusion to the theory of
proportions that Gregoire supplies by actualising unlimited geometrical pro-
gressions. The “term”, that is to say the sum of the geometrical progression
under study, is basically, the very term of Euclid theory in book V and the
operational target of the Opus geometricum. Let those remarks suﬃce (se-
fais) and let us remember that this ad infinitum push, once given, is made
compatible as things go, with Book V, so as to become an internal re-ordering
of the theory. Gregoire attempts to conceive the limits of series as partaking
of the Euclidean doctrine.
6.5. Extending the Notion of Number
Others authors lead XVIIth century mathematicians toward an extended no-
tion of numbers. Thus the Encyclope´die Me´thodique Mathe´matique of Diderot-
d’Alembert stressed that “M. Newton deﬁnes more precisely a number, not
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as a collection of units as does Euclid, but as an abstract ratio of a quantity
to another of the same nature, taken as a unit ; following such a notion, he
divided numbers into three categories : namely integers, containing the unit
so many times and without remainders, for instance 2,3 4 ; broken numbers
or fractions and deaf numbers, that is incommensurable ones”. In fact, Simon
Stevin in his master book La Disme, had paved this track (prepare le terrain)
which Malebranche, Wolﬀ, Leibniz will follow.
6.6. The Potentialities of Algebra and the Theory of
Proportions: Descartes
The growth of algebra, inherited from Arabs by Italian scientists on the
XVIIth century, and then transmitted to the other European countries and
into the hands of such people as Franc¸ois Vie`te, Thomas Harriott, Nicolas
Chuquet, dismisses the theory of proportions to its grave. Obviously, once
the transcriptions, the symbolism, the rules to multiply and transform poly-
nomials and equations have proved their eﬃciency, the central concepts of
Eudox and Euclid ’s theory are but dead instruments. When the habit is
taken, for instance, to equate a/b = (c/d)3 and ad3 = bc3, or to recognize in
y2 = 2ax−x2 the equation of a circle, then the quaint (bizarres) manipulations
of ratios and proportions will be replaced by ready-made techniques of com-
putation; very soon the (Euclidean) whys and hows of such transformations
will be forgotten: in our ﬁrst example one will not keep in mind the notions
derived from the deﬁnition (V,10) of doubled or trebled ratios, nor in the
second example suspect the presence of the proportion y : x :: (2a − x) : y,
where geometrical interpretation identiﬁes a circle.
It should be noted, though, that the founder of algebraic geometry do rest
their new technique on the theory of proportions. The one example of R.
Descartes will prove the point.
The ﬁrst advance by Descartes is to transform the product of two quantities
into an internal operation. Traditionally the product of two lines was the
rectangle built from them, but while the result is perfectly determined, it is
not an internal operation since this result (an area) is not homogeneous with
the initial data (lengths). Descartes does not evade the question and explicitly
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warns he does not intend to multiply two lines. If one cheeks carefully, the
Geometry oﬀers no instance of an operation which would associate to two
lines their product-line. To three lines, one of them styled “unit”, it is possible
to associate a fourth one, deﬁned by the theory of proportions and Thales
proposition (similar are the cases of the division and that of the square root,
the later being based on a corollary of Pythagora s theorem).
Indeed, a and b being given, z = a · b is but another form of z : a :: b : 1.
Thus, z is homogeneous with a, and not with a.b. It follows that to write
z = a · b is meaningless unless you keep in mind it signiﬁes z · 1 = a · b. Still,
the new technique is proﬁtable, since you can carry on the operation, what-
ever the number of dimensions. The Geometrie is not only the land-mark of
the nascent algebraic geometry, but also, and possibly more essentially, that
breaking point in the history of mathematic when the theory of proportions
yields precedence to algebraic calculus through a broadened notion of quanti-
ty: the ratio inherited from Eudox and Euclid is transformed into a quantity
with which and on which operations become feasible. It is well-known that
in the theory of proportions, genuine operations, if any, are restricted to the
set of rules allowed for preservation of proportions. Descartes’ Geometrie is
undoubtedly derived from Eudox and Euclid’s grand doctrine of continuous
quantities, but it successfully grafts on it a neutral element and a multiplica-
tion. Descartes mathematics are rooted in Euclid’s doctrine, exclusively, but
will fructify well beyond what could be conceived in the thirteen books of
the Alexandrine scientist. While getting rid of the “thorniest”points of the
doctrine, he retains the core of it, and one cannot overstress the notion that
the Cartesian algebraic geometry is centred on the theory of proportions: a
point to be more carefully examined at a later stage.
It is unquestionable that the Euclidean origin of Cartesian mathematics sets
a limitation since, in so many words, any relation which cannot be expressed
in terms of perfect ratios is unﬁtted for mathematical knowledge: such is the
case with transcendental quantities. Still, we must ask a question: why does
Descartes’s use of proportions outdates the theory, which is not the case with
Gregoire, and Roberval? We know the answer already: while Gregoire, and
Roberval as well, intend to built their algebras on ratios, Descartes assigns as
essential part to the algebraic symbolism of roots and loci, and thus launches
the new geometry as an algebra of polynomials -what algebra we now use.
The one speciﬁc re∗∗∗ant of the superb Euclidean machinery in the Carte-
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sian system is the rule of three. Let’s just keep in mind that the algebraic
automatism that will discard the Euclidean method to transform equalities
and inequalities derives initially its justiﬁcation from this very method.
6.7. Two Attempts at Generalisation: Cavalieri, Men-
goli
At ﬁrst sight the theory of proportions seems unﬁtted for many new branches
of XVIIth century mathematics. To be connected by a ratio, the quantities
must be of the same nature (3rd deﬁnition) and must, when multiplied, be
compared as smaller and larger (4th deﬁnition). When Cavalieri wrote his
Geometria indivisibilibus recondite, he introduces ratios between quantities
expressed through indivisible terms; now, it is obvious that such terms as
used by Cavalieri do not satisfy the demands we have to far mentioned: they
are not Euclidean quantities. Galileo’s disciple will nevertheless try to invest
his theory within the conceptual framework of Euclid’s Book Five.
He attempts to deﬁne a new type of quantity, neither a line, nor a surface,
nor a solid, but a collection of indivisibles : a ﬁgure being given on a plane,
the geometer deﬁnes a Regula. A plane parallel to this regula is motioned
from one tangent to the opposite tangent. The intersections between plane
and ﬁgure (which are the indivisibles of the ﬁgure), when considered together
(communes sectiones simul collectae) are known as Omnes lineae. The central
object now is the study of those ratios which may exist between the diﬀerent
collections of the Omnes lineae of two ﬁgures.
One essential principle to work out the properties of the Omnes is as follows:
“Ut unum ad unum, sic omnia ad omnia”. Basically, it may be interpreted
as the transition from one indivisible to another and one ﬁgure to an other
through the ratio of one Omnes to another.
Granting two ﬁgures F1 and F2 intersected through a common rule, Om1 to
Om2 naming the collection of indivisibles, the following conclusion is to be
reached:
F1 : F2 :: Om1 :: Om2, which is Book II, theorem 3.
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Cavalieri is perfectly aware he creates a new mathematical object, and care-
fully refrains from identifying F1 and Om1 as one and the same object. He
must promote this new object to the status of a quantity, as deﬁned by Eu-
clid, meaning it must conform to the axiom of Eudox and Euclid and Euclid’s
deﬁnition (V,4). Omnes lineae must be compatible with equality, comparison
and order axioms. Such is the meaning of Book II, theorem 1: “Quarum libet
figuram omnes lineae sunt magnitudines inter se rationem habentes” (from
which does appear that “all the lines”of the plane figures are quantities to
be compared through ratios). Here is the principle of indivisibles as summed
up by Ettore Caruccio: “If two plane figures are intersected by a collection
of parallel straight, and if the chords defined by the intersections are equal,
then the areas of the figures are also equal. If the chords have between them
a constant ratio, so have the areas. Similarly, if two solids are sliced by a
collection of parallel planes and the areas between such planes are equal, so
are the volumes. If the areas have between them a constant ratio, so have the
volumes”.
Cavalieri’s theory is thus to be considered as an attempt to conciliate inﬁnite
collections of objects and Euclid’s rules -that is an attempts to extend those
rules, so as to satisfy the demands (to quadrate curves, to locate gravity
centers, to clarify the notion of speed) of contemporary physics and mathe-
matics.
Mengoli, Cavalieri’s disciple and heir to the chair in Bologna, develops a broad
theory based -so he says- on Euclid’s ﬁfth book, which he calls the theory
of near-proportions. His intention (not unlike to Gregoire’s) is to stretch the
validity of proportions to the limit. He thus deﬁnes the near-inﬁnite ratio as
that which can be made larger than any given ratio, the near-zero ratio as
that which can be made smaller than any given ratio, and the near-equality
of ratios when the diﬀerence between two ratios is smaller than any given
diﬀerence. His intention then is to validate the theory of proportions when
operating on limits.
The debt owed by inﬁnitesimal calculus to the methods based on propor-
tions is acknowledged one century later in the Encyclopedie Mathematique
Me´thodique (Vol. I, p.703), which reads: “diﬀerential calculus is essentially
the ancients’ method of exhaustion, compressed into a simple and practical
analysis: it is the method to deﬁne through analysis the limits of the ratios”.
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6.8. Newton and the Principia
How entrenched (a re´siste´) Euclid’s doctrine stood appears in another way in
Newton’s work, as he utilises ancient methods at the very moment he creates
new ones.
The mathematics practiced in the Principia attempt to do without inﬁni-
tesimals and even the algebraic approach, and to reintroduce classical geo-
metrical methods. It is centred on the first and last ratios and evidences
Newton’s conﬁdence in Euclid’s theory.
Commentators could not but puzzled, and it is known that from the be-
ginning of the XVIIIth century, the editions of the Principia were supple-
mented by algebraic and inﬁnitesimal versions of Newton’s demonstrations
(Clairaut’s is a case in point). Recent studies of Newton’s intellectual evolu-
tion open new vistas to our presentation. Their common point is that New-
ton’s mathematical acquisitions have not followed the historical order of the
growth of mathematics. He started as an accomplished adept of Descartes’
approach to algebra and to its relationship to geometrical constructions. As
far as we know, he did not, in his younger years, attempt to enrich the an-
cients’ treasures of analysis. On the contrary, from 1673 to 1683, while he was
Lucas Professor in Cambridge, he discovered them. He may have, at the same
time, gathered doubts of, and objections to, the potentialities of Cartesian
geometry. Then he re-examines the very roots of classical and geometrical
methods. Thus will he choose to write the Principia not in the semi-classical
style of Descartes, but in truly classical and Euclidean style.
That future style of the Principia has been worked out in a critical pers-
pective, as evidenced in the 1680 treatise of Geometria Curvilinea. He at
once exploits classical treasures and works out completely new techniques,
especially a mode of calculus centred on the concept of function. Massimo
Galuzzi sums up Newton’s stand as follows: “He attempts to graft the ad-
vances of calculus onto the trunk of classical geometry [. . . ] To put it brieﬂy,
Geometria curvilinear could be described as an attempt to generalise the
classical theory of proportions”.
One must stressed at that point that the royal avenue is still that which
have been open by Euclid’s Book V, in the very period when a conceptual
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remodelling leads mathematics toward inﬁnitesimal calculus, and in the work
of the very author who blazes (pose les jalons) the new trail.
My intention, in this last points, has been to show that all those mathematical
techniques aiming at manipulating inﬁnite quantities (indivisible parts and
limits) are promoted by authors who claim a total allegiance to the theory
of Book ﬁve, may they at times reform it.
All this is but a swansong, though. Algebraic methods, the advances of in-
ﬁnitesimal analysis for ever supersede the theories of Eudox and Euclid’s.
The rules of algebraic calculus, the technical control of limits, the introduc-
tion and development of the concept of function, transcendental equations
and curves soon outclass the methods of Book V, which Leibniz and his heirs
no longer use. Leibniz immediately forges (and has it adopted by the Acta
eruditorum) uniﬁed symbols for ratios and divisions, since a proportion is
written a : b = c : d. He is even more explicit in the following passage:
“I have always stood against the use of special symbol for ration and pro-
portions, as the division sign is suﬃcient for ratios, and that of equality for
proportions. As a consequence, I write the ratio of a to b this way, a : b
or a/b, as you would to divide a by b. I inscribe a proportion, which is the
equality of two reasons, as the equality of two divisions or fractions. Thus
when I mean that the ratio of a to b is the same as that of c to d, it is enough
to write a : b = c : d or a/b = c/d”.
Conclusion
That Euclid was ever present in the mathematics and physics of the XVIIth
century, has been shown to satisfaction -so I hope, at least; but it is a puz-
zling presence, and announces some sort of fading oﬀ (aﬀaiblie), if not of a
crumbling down. Euclid’s works are also present in another ﬁeld at the same
period, more essentially and less critically that in sciences. I mean the ﬁeld
of philosophy. This second presence will just be mentioned, but it is most
impressive. Mathematics certainly is the model to accede to the truth that
Descartes, Pascal, Hobbes, Spinoza, Leibniz, and so many others cling to. Of
course, diﬀerent authors deﬁne diﬀerent processes: the concepts of certainty
107
Memorias XIV Encuentro de Geometr´ıa y II de Aritme´tica
vary, the transfers of those mathematical certainties to natural phenomena,
to moral arguments, to metaphysical demonstrations are seen as more or
less feasible; but for all authors the model does work. For Descartes, the
sparkles of divine truth are to be found in geometry. For Pascal, while the
perfect method never to err is beyond human reach, the best and most cer-
tain method accessible to men is perfectly taught by geometry. In order to
conceive clearly the modes of perception leading to certain assertions or nega-
tions, Spinoza uses “but one example”and precisely, that of four proportional
quantities, to conclude that only mathematicians conversant with the theory
may gather adequate notions. As for Leibniz, he writes metaphysics when he
writes geometry and reciprocally. Now, for all of them, apart from legitimate
technical criticisms which one may and must direct at the doctrine, Euclid’s
geometry remains the model of the model.
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